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The	 growth	 of	 Deleuze	 Studies	 over	 the	 last	 decade	 has	 been	 extraordinary.	There	are	now	two	annual	summits	on	the	work	of	Deleuze	(and	Guattari),	each	attended	by	hundreds	of	scholars.	And	to	the	surprise	of	many	non-Deleuzians,	the	quantity	of	 publications	on	Deleuze	 today	 far	 outstrips	 that	 of	 his	 eminent	contemporaries	Foucault	and	Derrida.	Nevertheless,	Deleuze	remains	a	marginal	figure	outside	of	 the	 field	 that	bears	his	name,	 especially	 in	philosophy	circles.	Furthermore,	 within	 the	 Deleuze	 community	 key	 aspects	 of	 his	 philosophy	remain	 poorly	 understood.	 James	 Williams’	 latest	 book	 on	 Deleuze	 makes	considerable	strides	in	rectifying	these	twin	problems.		As	 with	 his	 previous	 introductory	 guides	 to	 Deleuze’s	 work,	 Williams	 has	succeeded	 in	writing	an	accessible	book,	yet	one	 that	does	not	 compromise	on	philosophical	sophistication.	To	achieve	this	Williams	employs	several	effective	strategies,	 including	 an	 extensive	 introduction	 and	 comprehensive	 set	 of	footnotes,	the	former	for	the	benefit	of	newcomers	to	Deleuze	and	the	latter	for	experts.	Williams	 also	 devotes	much	 attention	 to	 the	method	 and	 approach	 of	Deleuze’s	philosophy,	forcefully	arguing	for	its	philosophical	rigour	and	novelty.	By	 implementing	 rhetorical	 devices	 that	 are	 often	 Socratic	 in	 style,	 Williams	consistently	remains	faithful	to	both	the	reader	and	Deleuze	–	no	easy	feat,	and	one	 that	 demands	 great	 pedagogical	 acumen.	 The	 result	 is	 a	 book	 that	establishes	 without	 doubt	 the	 importance	 of	 Deleuze	 to	 contemporary	philosophy	 of	 time,	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 Deleuze’s	 philosophy	 of	 time	 to	 his	work	more	broadly.		
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But	 this	 is	 not	 achieved	 without	 compromise.	 Due	 to	 his	 driving	 interest	 in	explicating	a	comprehensive,	consistent	and	systematic	philosophy	of	time	in	the	work	of	Deleuze,	Williams	downplays	or	ignores	many	of	Deleuze’s	engagements	with	 time	 that	 are	 not	 a	 specific	 component	 of	 this	 unitary	 system.	 There	 are	naturally	 advantages	 and	 drawbacks	 to	 this	 approach.	 Let	 us	 start	 with	 the	advantages.		Of	Deleuze’s	numerous	engagements	with	time	throughout	his	career,	his	theory	of	 the	 three	 syntheses	 of	 time	 is	 without	 doubt	 the	 most	 significant	 and	extensive.	The	 three	syntheses	are	also	notoriously	difficult	 to	comprehend.	As	such,	 a	 full	 and	 proper	 explication	 of	 the	 three	 syntheses	 of	 time	 is	 a	massive	undertaking,	achievable	by	only	the	most	adept	of	Deleuzian	scholars.	Williams	proves	himself	 to	be	more	 than	equal	 to	 the	 task.	This	 task,	however,	 takes	no	less	than	four	of	the	book’s	five	chapters:	one	on	each	of	the	three	syntheses	and	a	fourth	chapter	that	focuses	on	Deleuze’s	reading	of	Nietzsche’s	Eternal	Return,	but	specifically	with	respect	to	the	role	it	plays	in	the	three	syntheses.	As	for	the	book’s	final	chapter,	which	looks	at	time	in	Deleuze’s	The	Logic	of	Sense,	it	is	clear	that	Williams’	appraisal	is	guided	by	the	philosophical	system	that	has	just	been	erected	–	time	in	The	Logic	of	Sense	is	effectively	rendered	complementary	to	the	three	 syntheses	 (and	 not	 the	 other	 way	 around).	 As	 a	 telltale,	 Williams	occasionally	refers	to	the	three	syntheses	as	Deleuze’s	philosophy	of	time	(see	p.	106,	but	there	are	several	other	instances).	Thus	what	is	the	great	strength	and	value	 of	 Williams’	 book	 –	 a	 peerless	 analysis	 and	 explanation	 of	 the	 three	syntheses	of	time,	and	a	demonstration	of	how	time	in	The	Logic	of	Sense	 fits	 in	with	this	system	–	is	also	a	source	of	the	book’s	weakness:	its	limited	purview.	
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	To	 be	more	 specific,	Williams	 fails	 to	 mention	 several	 of	 Deleuze’s	 significant	engagements	 with	 time,	 including	 his	 reading	 of	 ‘the	 untimely’	 and	 his	discussions	 of	 ‘the	 meanwhile’,	 ‘the	 stutter’	 or	 ‘stammer’,	 and	 ‘dead	 time’.	Williams	has	good	reason	for	this:	his	objective,	as	he	makes	clear	from	page	one,	is	 to	 show	 how	 “Deleuze	 sets	 out	 one	 of	 the	 most	 original	 and	 sophisticated	philosophies	of	 time	 to	have	appeared	 in	 the	history	of	philosophy”	 (p.	1).	But	does	Deleuze	even	have	a	philosophy	of	 time,	by	which	I	mean,	does	he	have	a	
single	systematic	philosophy	of	time?	In	one	respect,	of	course	he	does:	the	three	syntheses	of	time.	But	in	another	respect	he	doesn’t,	insofar	as	he	engages	with	and	makes	contributions	to	the	philosophy	of	time	outside	of	this	system.	These	other	engagements	may	not	be	as	comprehensive	as	the	three	syntheses,	but	 it	would	be	harsh	to	 judge	them	as	 insignificant	and/or	reduce	them	to	the	three	syntheses.		There	 are	 other	 potential	 drawbacks	 to	 this	 approach	 of	 presenting	 the	 three	syntheses	as	the	‘core’	of	Deleuze’s	philosophy	of	time	to	which	Deleuze’s	other	engagements	 with	 time	 revolve	 around.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 it	 downplays	 the	originality	 and	 value	 of	 Deleuze’s	 engagements	 with	 time	 in	 his	 early	monographs,	 rendering	 them	 as	 proto-considerations	 for	 his	 latter	 systematic	philosophy	of	time	(whereas,	I	would	suggest	that	Deleuze’s	reading	of	Bergson	and	Nietzsche,	for	instance,	have	much	to	offer	our	thinking	about	time	beyond	their	roles	in	the	three	syntheses).	But	in	the	other	direction,	and	perhaps	more	importantly,	 Williams’	 approach	 covers	 over	 the	 fact	 that	 Deleuze	 effectively	
leaves	 behind	 this	 way	 of	 doing	 philosophy.	 Of	 Deleuze’s	 many	 books	 it	 is	
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generally	agreed	that	Difference	and	Repetition	is	his	greatest	philosophical	text	–	his	 ‘magnum	opus’.	There	are	 several	 reasons	 for	 this,	but	 the	most	 significant	one	is	that	it	is	the	only	occasion	where	Deleuze	sets	out	to	write	a	book	of	this	
kind:	 that	 is,	 a	 grand,	 systematic,	 comprehensive	 and	 radically	 original	metaphysics	–	a	philosophical	 treatise	 in	the	tradition	of	Kant’s	Critique	of	Pure	
Reason	and	Heidegger’s	Being	and	Time.	Thus	if	one	cannot	find	a	philosophy	of	time	of	this	kind	in	Deleuze’s	work	from	the	1970s	on,	 it	 is	not	merely	because	his	 interests	 have	 changed	 or	 because	 his	 latter	 engagements	 are	 of	 lesser	quality.	It	is	because	his	engagements	with	time	are	of	a	different	kind.1		Williams	is	of	course	fully	aware	of	all	this.	He	is	also	entirely	up	front	about	his	book’s	focus	on	Difference	and	Repetition	and	The	Logic	of	Sense.	But	in	coming	to	grips	with	 this	 systematic	philosophy	of	 time,	 the	 reader	 should	be	aware	 that	significant	engagements	lie	beyond	it,	and	furthermore,	that	it	is	entirely	open	to	debate	how	one	reads	the	relation	between	them:	is	there	a	‘core’	theory	against	which	‘peripheral’	developments/deviations	should	be	evaluated?		Williams	 shows	 his	 hand	most	 explicitly	 on	 this	 issue	 in	 the	 final	 pages	 of	 his	book.	 As	 way	 of	 a	 Conclusion,	 Williams	 explains	 to	 the	 reader	 why	 Deleuze’s	books	 on	 Cinema,	 which	 clearly	 have	 much	 to	 do	 with	 time,	 add	 nothing	 to	Deleuze’s	 philosophy	 of	 time,	 and	 indeed	 detract	 from	 it.	 His	 arguments	 are	rather	 convincing,	 if	 one	 presumes	 Deleuze	 to	 have	 ‘a’	 philosophy	 of	 time,	 as	expounded	 in	 its	 “most	 consistent	 and	 extensive	 form”	 (p.	 161)	 (ie.	Difference																																																									1	In	further	contrast	to	the	suggestion	that	Deleuze’s	interests	move	from	time	to	space	after	his	meeting	with	Guattari	(p.	2),	I	would	also	point	out	that	space	lies	at	the	heart	of	both	Difference	and	Repetition	and	The	Logic	of	Sense	no	less	than	time.	
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and	Repetition,	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	The	Logic	of	Sense),	 against	 which	 other	engagements	 on	 time	 are	 to	 be	 judged	 (as	 adding	 to	 or	 detracting	 from).	 But	another	possible	approach	would	be	to	say	that	Deleuze’s	engagements	with	and	contributions	to	our	thinking	about	time	occurs	in	a	number	of	ways,	coordinate	with	the	varied	nature	of	his	philosophy	and	career:	in	many	of	his	monographs	on	thinkers	(e.g.	Bergson	and	Nietzsche),	Deleuze	uses	these	studies	to	advance	novel	 thoughts	 about	 time	 (e.g.	 his	 reading	 of	 the	 virtual	 and	 duration,	 or	 the	eternal	 return);	 in	 Difference	 and	 Repetition	 Deleuze	 constructs	 a	 systematic	philosophy	 of	 time	 in	 ‘the	 grand	 style’	 (based	 in	part	 on	 some	 of	 his	 previous	original	 insights,	 but	 often	 distinct	 from	 them);	 in	 The	Logic	of	Sense,	 Deleuze	embarks	upon	a	new	adventure	 in	time,	one	that	can	be	formally	related	to	his	prior	system	(as	Williams	capably	does)	but	need	not	be	(since	Deleuze	doesn’t);	and	following	Deleuze’s	meeting	with	Guattari,	his	engagements	with	time	take	on	 a	 different	 character,	 less	 arborescent	 and	 more	 rhizomatic,	 to	 use	terminology	from	that	period.			With	 this	 approach	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 necessary	 to	 judge	 various	 engagements	against	 a	 preferred	 standard	or	demand	 fidelity	 to	 an	original	 intention/text	 –	something	Williams	himself	wishes	to	avoid	(pp.	12-13).	Such	an	approach	might	also	 compromise,	 however,	 the	 ability	 to	 advance	 ‘a’	 philosophy	of	 time	under	the	name	 ‘Deleuze’.	 I	should	therefore	make	it	clear	that	these	remarks	are	not	intended	as	criticisms	of	Williams’	project:	this	book	achieves	with	distinction	its	aims	 of	 (a)	 establishing	 Deleuze	 as	 one	 of	 the	 great	 thinkers	 of	 time,	 and	 (b)	demonstrating	the	significance	of	time	to	his	mature	(solo)	metaphysics,	and	to	these	 ends	Williams	must	 be	 commended.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 book	 also	 leaves	
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ample	space	for	alternative	approaches	to	Deleuze	and	time,	all	of	which	will	no	doubt	be	better	off	as	a	result	of	Williams’	exemplary	efforts.	
